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POLICY CHALLENGE
The European Union's weak long-term growth potential and unsatisfactory recov-
ery from the crisis represent a major policy challenge. Over and above the struc-
tural reform agenda, which vitally important, bold policy action is needed. The
priority is to get bank credit going. Banking problems need to be assessed prop-
erly and bank resolution and recapitalisation should be pursued. Second, foster-
ing the reallocation of factors to the most productive firms and the sectors that
contribute to aggregate rebalancing is vital. Addressing intra-euro area competi-
tiveness divergence is essential
to support growth in southern
Europe. Third, the speed of fiscal
adjustment needs to be appro-
priate and EU funds should be
frontloaded to countries in deep
recession, while the European
Investment Bank should in-
crease investment.
EU15 GDP relative to the US, 1980-2017 (US = 100)
THE ISSUE The European Union's pre-crisis growth performance was disap-
pointing enough, but the performance has been even more dismal since the
onset of the crisis. Weak growth is undermining private and public deleverag-
ing, and is fueling continued banking fragility. Persistently high unemployment
is eroding skills, discouraging labour market participation and undermining the
EU’s long-term growth potential. Low overall growth is making it much tougher
for the hard-hit economies in southern Europe to recover competitiveness and
regain control of their public finances. Stagnation would reduce the attractive-
ness of Europe for investment. Under these conditions, Europe's social models
are bound to prove unsustainable.
Source: Bruegel based on IMF Word Economic Outlook October 2012. Note: GDP is
measured at purchasing power parity. EU15: EU members before 2004. EU12: EU
members that joined in 2004/2007.
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EUROPE’S GROWTH PROBLEM AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
1. For data for all EU
countries for all
indicators studied in
this Policy Brief, see the
supplementary charts,
available at
http://www.bruegel.org/i
ndex.php?id=257.
broadly stable relative to the US,
but this is largely due to pre-crisis
job creation – a positive develop-
ment on its own. Relative GDP per
employee declined by five per-
centage points between 1997 and
2007 and by another six percent-
age points since1. There is some
comfort to be found in the contin-
ued catching-up of the countries
that joined the EU in 2004 and
after, but their future will also be at
stake if the advanced European
countries continue to lag behind.
Unlike the US and Japan, Europe’s
growth and unemployment num-
bers have consistently disap-
pointed since 2007 (Figure 1).
Productivity developments remain
weak, even in EU countries with
healthier private and public bal-
ance sheets. Unemployment con-
tinues to grow and set new
records. This is again in contrast to
the developments in the US,
where the initial impact on em-
ployment of the recession was
much worse, but where job cre-
ation has resumed, the unemploy-
ment rate has declined from its
post-2007 heights, and invest-
ment has also resumed (Figure 2).
What are the reasons for the wors-
ening performance since 2007?
Obstacles to productivity per-
formance? Ill-timed public
deleveraging? Banking sector
weaknesses? Or, especially in the
euro area, capital misallocation
and misaligned prices? In this
Policy Brief four sections we dis-
cuss these questions, before
drawing policy conclusions.
THE PRODUCTIVITY PROBLEM
Before 2007, Europe's weak pro-
ductivity performance reflected
well-known structural weak-
nesses: insufficient investment in
human capital and research, a
limited ability to transition from
an imitation-based economy to
an innovation-based economy,
excessive reliance on established
firms in traditional industries and,
in a number of countries, a growth
model that was based on boom-
ing but low-productivity construc-
tion and traditional services.
2005 2010 2015 2005 2010 2015 2005 2010 2015 2005 2010 2015
130
120
110
100
90
130
120
110
100
90
130
120
110
100
90
130
120
110
100
90
EU15 EU12 United States Japan
April 2008 Sept 2011 Oct 2012
Source: Bruegel calculations using different editions of the IMF World Economic Outlook. Note:
the first vertical line indicates 2007, the second 2012.
Figure 1: Growth forecasts at different dates (2007= 100)
Table 1: GDP, GDP per capita and GDP per employee at PPP (US=100)
1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012 2017
EU15 GDP 115 105 106 99 96 94 90 83
GDP/capita 75 71 74 72 73 72 71 67
GDP/employee 80 80 82 83 79 78 74
EU12 GDP 11 11 12 13 13
GDP/capita 28 30 36 39 41
GDP/employee 37 40 45 47
Japan GDP 38 38 41 37 32 31 29 27
GDP/capita 75 75 85 81 72 72 73 70
GDP/employee 68 72 76 74 69 70 67
Source: Bruegel based IMF October 2012 WEO and Eurostat. PPP = purchasing power parity.
EUROPE’S PRE-CRISIS GROWTH
PERFORMANCE was disappointing
enough, but the performance
since the onset of the crisis has
been even more dismal. Table 1
shows that while the total output
of EU15 countries (EU members
before 2004) exceeded that of the
United States by 15 percent in
1982, it is expected to be 17 per-
cent lower in 2017. EU15 per
capita income has remained
EU15 EU12* United States Japan
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Source: Bruegel based on AMECO database, European Commission. Note: * in right hand panel,
EU 9 (not including Bulgaria, Latvia, Malta).
Figure 2: The impact of the recession on employment and business
investment (2007 = 100)
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2. See Zachmann, Georg
(2012) ‘Smart choices
for growth’, Policy
Contribution 2012/21,
Bruegel.
3. See Becker, Torbjörn,
Daniel Daianu, Zsolt
Darvas, Vladimir
Gligorov, Michael A.
Landesmann, Pavle
Petrovic, Jean Pisani-
Ferry, Dariusz K. Rosati,
André Sapir and
Beatrice Weder di
Mauro (2010) Whither
growth in central and
eastern Europe? Policy
lessons for an
integrated Europe,
Blueprint Volume XI,
Bruegel.
4. See Darvas, Zsolt
(2012) ‘Compositional
effects on productivity,
labour cost and export
adjustments’, Policy
Contribution 2012/11,
Bruegel. 
5. See eg Bank of Eng-
land (2012) Inflation
Report, November, p33.
6. See Altomonte, Carlo
and Gianmarco Otta-
viano (2011) ‘The role
of international produc-
tion sharing in EU pro-
ductivity and
competitiveness’, EIB
Papers vol 16 no1.
Efficiency of public administra-
tions, education levels and weak
innovation performance have
been additional impediments to
growth2. Most of the countries that
joined the EU in 2004/2007 em-
barked on technological transfer-
driven convergence3.
Since 2007, the EU15 has taken a
productivity holiday, while pro-
ductivity has increased rapidly in
the US (Figure 3). In terms of total
factor productivity, both the EU15
and EU12 lag behind Japan. Even
economically stronger countries,
such as Germany, lag behind the
US, and the evolution in the
United Kingdom does not differ
markedly from that of continental
economies. Some hard-hit coun-
tries, such as Ireland, Spain and
Latvia, have apparently recorded
outstanding labour productivity
performances since 2007, but
most of these gains have been
due to compositional changes,
such as the shrinkage of low-pro-
ductivity construction and low
value-added services and their
total factor productivity develop-
ments were weak4. In terms of pro-
ductivity there have been very
few truly good performers in the
EU. Poland is one.
Labour hoarding can partly ex-
plain the initial response to the
shock of the recession. Employ-
ment contracted by five percent
between 2007 and 2010 in the
US, while in several European
countries the employment shock
was of limited magnitude. Public
policies, such as Kurzarbeit, a
scheme financed by the German
government to support part-time
work and keep workers em-
ployed, were one factor behind
this response. Firms also hoarded
labour, expecting a rebound and
thereby limiting the initial rise in
unemployment. Five years on,
however, the productivity setback
has become permanent, con-
tributing to lower potential output. 
This cannot be regarded as a
cyclical phenomenon anymore.
In the short run, weak productiv-
ity performance can be related to
insufficient demand through the
so-called productivity cycle. But a
weak cyclical position of the
economy cannot explain sus-
tained poor productivity.
A number of structural factors
have also contributed to weak
productivity performance5: 
• Banking problems: the in-
creased cost and reduced
availability, of working capital
limits investment and thereby
the adoption of new technolo-
gies, and may lead to a shift
toward more labour-intensive,
but less efficient production.
• Low level of integration in the
global value chain: the com-
plexity of firms’ internationali-
sation strategies is related to
productivity6. Countries that
are more integrated into the
global value chain, such as
Germany and Poland, took ad-
vantage of global demand and
thereby achieved better pro-
ductivity performance than
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Source: Bruegel based on Conference Board TED database January 2013. EU15: EU members
before 2004. EU12: EU members that joined in 2004 and 2007.
Figure 3: Productivity developments, 2007-2012 (2007=100)
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total credit to the private nonfinancial sector’, BIS Quarterly Review, March, pp 65-81 (private
debt), Eurostat (public debt except for Japan, GDP and exchange rates), and McKinsey (public
debt for Japan). Note: the vertical line corresponds to 2008Q3. * EU3: the aggregate of the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (data for other new member states is not available).
Figure 4: Gross debt (% GDP), 1990Q1-2012Q3
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more inward looking countries,
such as the UK and Spain.
• Pro-cyclicality of business re-
search and development ex-
penditures: the lingering crisis
reduces the pace of innovation
and companies’ adoption of
more innovative technologies,
which weakens business in-
vestment, and thereby reduces
the productivity increase.
• Impediments to reallocation
across sectors and between
firms: dysfunctional financial
systems hamper productivity-
enhancing restructuring, while
obstacles arising from labour,
capital market and bankruptcy
regulations weigh more heavily
in a time of profound change.
• Uncertain macroeconomic and
financial outlook can also
make companies cautious
about investing, thereby grad-
ually eroding productivity.
THE DELEVERAGING PROBLEM
In the run-up to the crisis, private
sector debt increased substan-
tially in the EU and the US, while in
Japan the deleveraging process
that started in the 1990s contin-
ued (Figure 4). Household and
corporate indebtedness in-
creased substantially, while
public debt was rather stable or
even declining slightly7.
Since the beginning of the crisis,
private debt deleveraging in
Europe has proved slower than in
the US. In the aftermath of the
Great Recession, Europe put the
emphasis on fiscal ‘exit strate-
gies’, overlooking private debt
problems. Corporate and house-
hold debt has continued to in-
crease as a share of GDP. In the
US, household debt has sharply
reduced and corporate debt has
stabilised. Whereas public debt
has increased more in the US than
in Europe since 2007, total debt
(excluding the financial sector)
has increased markedly less. The
US is therefore ahead of  Europe in
the aggregate deleveraging
process. In Japan, meanwhile, pri-
vate debt has remained stable
and the whole of the increase in
total debt has come from the gov-
ernment sector.
A combination of factors is re-
sponsible for this outcome:
• Lower profitability of the corpo-
rate sector in part of Europe,
which has made it dependent
on borrowing;
• Different bankruptcy laws and
procedures. Household debt in
the US was significantly re-
duced through personal bank-
ruptcies8.
• More expensive financing con-
ditions in part of Europe, espe-
cially southern countries in the
euro area and bank weakness
leading them to continue ex-
tending credit to weak firms in
order to avoid the realisation of
losses (a process known as
‘zombification’)
• Lower nominal GDP growth, in
part as a consequence of more
aggressive budgetary consoli-
dation against the background
of a still-weak private economy.
THE BANKING PROBLEM
Financial intermediation is of
central importance for growth.
Ample international experience
documents that the growth of an
economy is negatively affected
by a weak financial system. The
case of Japan illustrates that a
combination of banking problems
and debt overhang in the
corporate sector can have long-
lasting negative consequences
for growth.
Financial intermediation in Europe
remains centred on the banks, al-
though there is some evidence of
a gradual and slow shift to capital
markets9. Although transforma-
tion of the financial system to-
wards a greater share of capital-
market based intermediation is
likely to be a long-term trend that
will have profound implications
for Europe’s economy, in the short
7. See Ruscher, Eric and
Guntram B. Wolff
(2012) ‘Corporate bal-
ance sheet adjustment,
stylized facts, causes
and consequences’,
Working Paper
2012/03, Bruegel.
8. The Economist
(2012) ‘The hangover.
America is recovering
from the debt bust
faster than European
countries. Why?’, 21
January,
http://www.economist.c
om/node/21543139.
9. Darvas, Zsolt (2013)
‘Can Europe recover
without credit?’, Policy
Contribution 2013/03,
Bruegel, and ECB
(2013) Monthly Bul-
letin March, p45, docu-
ments the substitution
effect with MFI loans
growing at a very sub-
dued rate or even
shrinking since 2009,
and debt securities
growing in volume at a
higher rate than before
2009.
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Source: Bruegel based on BIS, Eurostat, McKinsey. Note: EU3 is the aggregate of the Czech Re-
public, Hungary and Poland (data for the other new member states is not available). We do not
show data on financial corporations, because an increase/decrease in their gross debt can indi-
cate increased/decreased lending activities.
Figure 5: Change in gross debt (in % of GDP) from 2007Q4 to 2012Q3
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10. Speedy restructur-
ing in Sweden fostered
economic adjustment
and productivity
growth, while in Japan
the 'zombification' of
banks contributed to a
decade of stagflation
when productivity
hardly improved. 
11. European Commis-
sion, ‘EU state aid con-
trol and financial
stability’, presentation
at Bruegel workshop, 8
March 2013.
11. There were similar
developments to the
southern euro-area
countries in the Baltic
states, and there was a
rapid adjustment, but at
a very high price. See
Blanchard (2012)
‘Lessons from Latvia’,
IMF Direct: http://blog-
imfdi-
rect.imf.org/2012/06/1
1/lessons-from-latvia/. 
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Banks with weak balance sheets
lend on too expensive terms or
lend to insolvent borrowers to
keep them afloat are a drag on
growth. In year five of the crisis,
Europe’s banking system remains
fragile. About a fourth of the Euro-
pean banking system is still
under state aid control and de-
pends on public support11,
whereas banks have for long re-
gained independence in the US.
Risk premia paid by banks are sig-
nificantly higher in Europe than in
Japan and the US (Figure 7).
THE PRICE MISALIGNMENT AND
CAPITAL MISALLOCATION
PROBLEM IN THE EURO AREA12
Excessive housing booms have
distorted prices and wages and
led to the misallocation of capital
in a number of EU countries, as
exemplified by construction
booms and the unsustainably
high share in the economy of the
construction sector prior to the
term bank-based financial inter-
mediation remains of central im-
portance given its large base.
Bank-based credit growth in the
majority of EU countries has been
weak since 2008. The statistics
for the euro area paint a picture of
very subdued credit growth. The
year-on-year growth rate of euro-
area credit has not exceeded two
percent, compared to the pre-
crisis 10 percent. In the UK, bank-
based credit declined, while in
Poland and Romania credit growth
slowed down in 2009/10, but sig-
nificantly accelerated afterwards.
The European numbers compare
with more robust credit growth in
the US, which has bounced back
to five percent annual growth.
Credit growth is particularly weak
in the south of Europe. Demand
for credit is weak, reflecting the
economic outlook and subdued
business confidence. Lending
conditions in countries under
stress remain tight and the
supply of credit limited. Also, writ-
ing-down bad loans reduce credit
aggregates. The European Central
Bank continues to stress that de-
spite an improvement in the mon-
etary transmission mechanism,
monetary policy action does not
get properly transmitted to all
euro-area countries, and this im-
pairs the provision of credit to the
real economy.
Speedy resolution of banking
problems is an important condi-
tion for growth to resume. The past
experience of Sweden and Japan
illustrates the benefits of speedy
action (Figure 6)10. During the cur-
rent crisis, in the US, significant
bank restructuring occurred rela-
tively early in the crisis.
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Source: Jean Pisani-Ferry and Bruno van Pottelsberghe (2009) ‘Handle with care! Post-crisis
growth in the EU’, Policy Brief 2009/02, Bruegel.
Figure 6: Distribution of bank losses in the Japanese and Swedish
banking crises in the early 1990s
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Figure 7: Bank 5-year credit default swap (CDS) spread, 1 January
2008 – 2 April 2013
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recession. In such conditions
output had grown above potential
and was bound to adjust
downward (Figure 8).
At the same time, the share of
manufacturing declined signifi-
cantly in the south of Europe, and
also in France, while in the north
of Europe, the manufacturing
share was relatively stable
(Figure 9).
In the euro area, the process was
accompanied by a major distor-
tion in relative prices (Figure 10).
The real exchange rate of all
southern euro-area members
became overvalued, while it
became undervalued in most
northern members. Since euro-
area members do not have stand-
alone exchange rates, only
intra-euro area adjustment can
correct for these divergences.
Adjustment has started, but
progress is too slow. The good
news is that the export perform-
ance of eg Ireland, Spain and Por-
tugal is outstanding. The external
indebtedness of these countries
is so high that further improve-
ment in the trade balance is
needed to achieve external sus-
tainability. Price adjustment has
started in several countries, but
the inflation rate in Italy, a coun-
try that also needs sectoral reallo-
cation toward the tradable sector
to revive growth, remains above
euro area average. At the same
time, the inflation rate in Germany
has remained low and is expected
to remain below euro average.
Major differences in labour
market conditions translate only
slowly into inflation differentials.
Relative wages have started to
adjust, but prices exhibit rigidity.
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Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat data. The three groups are North (Austria, Finland, Germany,
Netherlands), Centre (Belgium and France) and South (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain).
These groups result from a systematic analysis based on an array of indicators.
Figure 8: Share of construction in total value added, euro-area
countries
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Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat data. See note to Figure 8 for breakdown of country groups. 
Figure 9: Manufacturing, share in total value added of country group
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Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat data. See note to Figure 8 for breakdown of country groups. 
Figure 10: Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices, cumulative deviation
with respect to the euro area since 1998
Without the relative price adjust-
ment, the necessary reallocation
of economic activities toward the
tradable sector in the south will
not take place. Absent a symmet-
ric enough adjustment, meaning
inflation in the euro area is at two
percent with higher-than two per-
cent inflation in Germany and
other surplus countries and close
to zero inflation in the south, the
south will need to deflate. That
would endanger both private and
public debt deleveraging, putting
debt sustainability at risk and de-
laying the recovery even further.
CONCLUSIONS
Europe’s long-term growth strat-
egy has so far failed. Various ini-
tiatives have been unable to
increase the growth potential of
the EU15. EU12 members have on
average performed better, but
their futures will crucially depend
on the EU15 because of the EU’s
financial and trade integration.
This failure is now compounded
by a danger that the short- to
medium-term challenges will in-
teract perversely with the longer
term ones and lastingly weigh on
Europe’s performance. Much of
Europe suffers from a mutually re-
inforcing interaction between lim-
ited productivity gains, protracted
deleveraging, weak banking sec-
tors and distorted relative prices.
This combination contributes to
an overall weakening of economic
growth and threatens to turn into
self-perpetuating stagnation. This
dark picture calls for bold policy
action significantly beyond what
is currently being undertaken.
Policy action should comprehen-
sively address all four aspects of
br
ue
ge
lp
ol
ic
yb
ri
ef
07
EUROPE’S GROWTH PROBLEM AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
the problem. But the quest for
growth is elusive. Growth policies
are by nature difficult to encapsu-
late in a few recommendations.
So the following suggestions are
in no way exhaustive.
The sequencing of policy action is
important. Without credit, invest-
ment and growth, any structural
reform is likely to fall victim to
popular rejection. If fiscal re-
trenchment does not deliver re-
sults, support for it will vanish.
Therefore, the strengthening of
banking systems and the recogni-
tion of bad loans should be priori-
tised in order to create conditions
for a resumption of private-led
demand. Relative price and wage
adjustment and structural re-
forms should also be pursued, but
are unlikely to deliver immedi-
ately, in particular in the absence
of growth.
The most urgent priority is there-
fore restoring a fully functional fi-
nancial system, which is a
precondition for the resumption
of productivity and
growth. Europe for
too long has refused
to recognise this.
The forthcoming in-
troduction of the
Single Supervisory
Mechanism (SSM)
offers a unique op-
portunity to com-
plete the strengthening of the
European banking system. Before
the ECB carries out the ‘compre-
hensive assessment’ of the
banks brought under its supervi-
sion, national authorities should
trigger a recapitalisation of under-
capitalised banks and a resolu-
tion of insolvent ones. The ECB
should make clear that it will not
accept undercapitalised banks for
the single supervisory system.
Countries outside the SSM should
also revitalise their domestic
banks. The European Commission
should encourage governments
to bear the fiscal costs if neces-
sary by announcing that deficit
increases from public recapitali-
sations carried out until end-2013
will be treated as one-off costs
within the framework of the Ex-
cessive Deficit Procedure.
Negotiations for the Bank Resolu-
tion and Recovery Directive
should be urgently completed to
achieve a level playing field. It is
important that cross-country dif-
ferences in banking resolution are
minimised to avoid a major frag-
mentation of the single market.
The establishment of a banking
union is one of the most impor-
tant projects to re-establish
growth in the euro area and
beyond. It will greatly contribute
to repairing monetary policy
transmission in the euro area. It
needs to involve all
key elements
beyond supervision
(centralised resolu-
tion mechanism
and an appropriate
common fiscal
backstop) that are
under discussion.
Banks that have
passed the ECB’s comprehensive
assessment should be brought
under the banking union and
become truly European banks
with clearly defined burden-shar-
ing arrangements.
Fostering the reallocation of fac-
tors to the most productive firms
and the sectors that contribute to
‘Europe’s long-term
growth strategy has
so far failed; various
initiatives have not
increased the growth
potential of the EU15.’
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aggregate rebalancing is vital for
productivity and growth. It in-
volves bolder monetary action in
combination with targeted fiscal
support. As banks may choose
not to lend to SMEs because loans
are subject to significant haircuts
when taken as collateral in central
bank repo operations, there is a
case for providing support to the
enhancement of this collateral. In
the euro area, the
ECB cannot carry
that fiscal risk. In-
stead, temporary
collateral enhance-
ment schemes
should be explored,
for example, in liai-
son with the Euro-
pean Investment
Bank (EIB). Furthermore, EIB facil-
ities should also be used to sup-
port credit, in particular for SMEs.
Better access to finance of SMEs
would greatly help the creation of
new employment in the export
sector.
Appropriate speed of fiscal adjust-
ment is paramount. The speed of
fiscal adjustment needs to be
adapted to the context of stagnat-
ing economies throughout the EU.
This is especially a concern where
households and firms are still in
the process of deleveraging. At
the same time, it is important to
ensure maximum credibility to
the medium-term consolidation
process.  To this end, the new Eu-
ropean fiscal framework should
be mobilised in full so that com-
mitments to future fiscal consoli-
above two percent, as long as
euro-area price stability remains
ensured.
Last but not least, pro-growth
reforms are of central importance
to increase long-term productivity
and need to be continued
vigorously throughout the EU. The
EU should provide incentives to
addressing weaknesses in
product, labour and capital
markets as well in the building of
skills. To this end it should explore
new approaches, including
contractual budgetary support
within the framework of sector-
specific initiatives.
Europe’s growth problem does not
result from a single set of chal-
lenges. It involves the supply and
the demand sides; real- and finan-
cial-sector issues; and private and
public-sector aspects. The EU is
used to policymaking by rules and
procedures. This is fine in normal
times, but it is not the right ap-
proach to address the current
quagmire. It is not by adding a new
layer of procedures that this prob-
lem will be solved. It is by formulat-
ing a diagnosis, setting priorities,
formulating a strategy, and imple-
menting it across policy areas.
This Policy Brief was prepared for
the informal meeting of EU finance
ministers (ECOFIN) of 12 April
2013. Thanks for research assis-
tance are due to Francesca Barbi-
ero, Adrian Bosshard, Giuseppe
Daluiso, Hannah Lichtenberg and
Erkki Vihriälä.
dation are made adequately spe-
cific and credible and emphasis
should be put on structural meas-
ures with a lasting medium-term
impact. Pension reforms are one
way of credibly increasing debt
sustainability allowing for a
slower fiscal consolidation path.
A frontloaded payment of EU
funds to countries in deep reces-
sion as well as addi-
tional EIB capital to
promote growth ini-
tiatives is war-
ranted. The fiscal
retrenchment in the
South of Europe in
particular is likely to
further dampen
economic activity
and increase social hardship un-
dermining economic and political
stability. Frontloaded payments
from EU funds, as well as EU-sup-
ported investments, will help ad-
dress demand weaknesses due
to fiscal adjustment and private
sector deleveraging.
Addressing intra-euro area com-
petitiveness divergences is es-
sential to support growth in
southern Europe. Wage rebalanc-
ing should involve northern
Europe as well as southern
Europe. Consistent with the ECB
mandate, average inflation in the
euro area should not be allowed
to fall below the two percent
target and northern Europe
should refrain from domestic
policy action that would prevent
domestic inflation from rising
‘The speed of fiscal
adjustment needs to
be adapted to the
context of stagnating
economies through-
out the EU.’
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